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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder voting is the linchpin of corporate governance,
accountability, and legitimacy. Corporations2 create countless jobs, generate
indispensable products and services, and influence the national dialog on
1. Thank you to Professor David A. Skeel for his invaluable guidance with this
Comment and his many classroom hours teaching me Corporate Law. Thank you to everyone
at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law who assisted with their time, effort,
and suggestions.
2. Unless otherwise stated, corporation in this Comment refers to a company
incorporated in Delaware, publicly traded on a national exchange, and with at least 2,000
shareholders.
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pressing issues. Yet all corporations must answer to their voters, the
shareholders.
Unfortunately, modern shareholder voting is broken. The “current
system was not created through intentional architecture and design,”3 but
through haphazard happenstance and necessity. Accurate lists of
shareholders are non-existent. Ownership recordkeeping is painful. Some
shareholders over-vote. Some savvy investors routinely manipulate the
system. Modern shareholder voting undermines corporate governance.
Blockchain technology, considered by many as a once-in-a-generation
breakthrough, offers a solution. Through its simple yet ingenious design,
blockchain provides the accuracy, transparency, and trust currently missing
from shareholder voting.
If blockchain takes hold, it may solve many problems with modern
shareholder voting. The prevalence of street name ownership could diminish
because a beneficial owner could hold and record shares in her own name.
With easier ownership identification, some voting practices that aid over-
voting and hedging may disappear. Vote counts could become accurate,
precise, and verifiable. At least some legitimacy of corporate governance
would be restored.
Corporate decision-making will remain board-centric under the law, but
the future is bright for advocates of shareholder empowerment. Products
built on blockchain could enable shareholders to engage with corporations
in new ways. New tools and networks could eliminate structural obstacles
impeding shareholder involvement in corporate governance.
This Comment discusses the potential hard fork4 that blockchain may
introduce to shareholder voting in the United States. Part I—The Present—
reviews modern concepts of corporate governance and the problems
afflicting the voting system. The first section introduces the guiding
concepts of U.S. corporate governance. Ideally, governance is defined by a
division of labor between boards of directors and shareholders. Boards are
responsible for managing the business, while shareholders are empowered to
vote on specific topics such as the election of directors. The laws incentivize
a board-centric approach to decision-making. The second section explains
why modern governance is broken. It analyzes how share ownership
depends on a “street name” regime. Street name uses countless custodians
to hold shares on behalf of a beneficial owner. This set-up is convenient, but
carries consequences. Street name complicates tracking share ownership.
3. DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION, EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING
THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE 2 (2016).
4. A hard fork is a major change in a blockchain’s protocol that rewrites fundamental
information and makes previously invalid information valid.
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Identifying owners is a challenge. Even when the street name system works
as intended, the results are often incorrect. A practice called empty voting
has emerged in which investors (by mistake or misconduct) are separated
from their beneficial ownership. Some empty voting permits hedging and
lending that leads to over-voting or voting without economic interests. Street
name has also facilitated the domination of institutional investors over the
U.S. equities market. These influential investors vote more often than retail
investors, but their business models restrict their ability to express
displeasure with a corporation’s performance by selling stock.
Consequently, as shareholder voting gains importance in equity markets, its
flaws must be fixed to avoid eroding the legitimacy of corporate governance.
One additional flaw is the vagaries of shareholder vote counting. Accurate
counts and verifications are impossible. Directors disproportionately win
close contests by using manipulation, personal influence, and blank checks
to pursue their preferred policies.
Part II—The Future—delves into blockchain and its application to
shareholder voting by examining the technology’s immediate impact on
modern problems and its long-term transformative potential. The first
section gives an introduction to blockchain technology. Blockchain is a
specialized database using cryptography, game theory, and economics to
incentivize decentralized groups of people to record information in a public,
transparent, shared, and secure manner. The technology is hampered by
some weaknesses that are still being addressed. It is prone to potential attack
by collusion, raises questions about privacy and sensible governance, and
faces technical challenges of energy consumption, storage capacity, and
personal information security. Some flexible variations of blockchain have
developed to address many of these concerns. Public blockchains are
entirely decentralized with no top-down decision-makers. Permissioned
blockchains are run by a central authority that governs access and protocols.
Between these extremes are hybrid forms that combine features of public and
permissioned blockchains. The second section theorizes about blockchain-
based applications for shareholder voting. Blockchain is a foundational
technology—a development that lays the groundwork for additional
inventions, innovations, and industries to grow. Using a framework for
foundational technologies, blockchain’s impact on shareholder voting is
tracked through four distinct phases that build on each other. During the
Single Use phase, innovations are low in novelty and complexity.
Blockchain solutions will likely address many of the problems discussed in
Part I. Shareholder voting seems to have already entered this phase. At the
Localization phase, innovations are high in novelty and low in complexity.
Blockchain will improve shareholder voting with new ideas and tools to
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augment existing systems. Boards may use blockchain to issue intriguing
new stock classes to attract investment. These stock classes could offer
varying degrees of privacy, automatically execute options and warrants,
establish tenured voting, or tie voting rights to company performance. In the
Substitution phase, innovations are low in novelty and high in complexity.
Deeply embedded business models will compete with or be replaced by new
solutions. Major depository trusts, proxy service providers, and custodians
that exist today will adapt their business models or lose market share and
possibly perish. In the Transformation phase, innovations are high in both
novelty and complexity. New industries and systems will emerge to service
shareholder voting. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (groups that
run on blockchain protocols) may form to coordinate diffuse shareholders
with similar interests.
PART I: THE PRESENT
A. Introduction to Shareholder Voting
In the United States, corporate governance and shareholder voting laws
are guided by securities exchange regulations and the corporate law of the
state where a company chooses to incorporate. For most publicly traded
companies, this chosen state is Delaware—home to the widely-regarded
dominant supplier of corporate law.5
Business owners create a corporation in Delaware by filing articles of
incorporation (commonly referred to as the charter) with the Delaware
Secretary of State. The charter establishes basic information about the
corporation such as the total amount of authorized shares6 which it is
prohibited from over-issuing.7 The filing also creates an entity recognized
as a legal person8 with a unique set of attributes, including a governance
5. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & IMAN ANABTAWI, ET AL., CAN DELAWARE BE
DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW, 238 (2018)
(noting that in 2016, about one million business associations—5% of all US business
entities—were domiciled in Delaware, including 64% of the Fortune 500, 86% of that year’s
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), and more than half of all companies traded on major
exchanges such as the NYSE and NASDAQ).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(4)(2018).
7. Id. at § 161.
8. See Legal Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining artificial
person as “[a]n entity, such as a corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights and
duties of a human being”); see generally James G. Wright III, A Step Too Far: Recent Trends
in Corporate Personhood and the Overexpansion of Corporate Rights, 49 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 889 (2016) (describing the historical development in U.S. law of the corporate
personhood concept, which has granted corporations the legal rights of natural persons such
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system centered upon centralized management.9
Under this governance system, a board of directors is elected and
entrusted with overseeing the business affairs of the corporation.10 Day-to-
day authority is delegated by the board of directors to officers.11 In managing
the corporation’s business, the directors owe fiduciary duties of care12 and
loyalty13 to the corporation —not the shareholders or stakeholders. Delaware
courts have repeatedly affirmed that the board of directors has the exclusive
authority to regulate the corporation’s capital structure by issuing new shares
or classes of stock, while ensuring the soundness of the instruments upon
which it is based.14
The corporation’s shareholders, in turn, have more conditional and
limited responsibilities. Shareholders hold equity stock in the corporation,
granting them residual rights in the company’s earnings and voting rights to
approve particular matters.15 Yet, unlike the one-vote one-person standard
as owning property, entering into contracts, engaging in litigation, and receiving protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
9. Centralized management is an agreed upon fundamental attribute of a corporation,
but some disagreement still exists about the exact list of traits. See REINIER KRAAKMAN &
JOHN ARMOUR, ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5-17 (2d ed. 2009) (listing a corporation’s fundamental attributes as
legal personality, limited liability, transferability of share, centralized management, and
investor ownership); see also ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 85-110 (3rd ed. 2009) (listing perpetual existence and appointed
by equity as other attributes of a corporation).
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)(2018).
11. This Comment does not discuss differences between a corporation’s directors and
officers because the comment focuses on how blockchain-based shareholder voting may
impact the relationship between shareholders and the people responsible for managing the
corporation’s business.
12. Delaware law’s duty of care is not codified in statute. It is derived from case law.
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (explaining that the duty of
care requires director to act in the same manner as a reasonable person would in making
business decisions by keeping themselves reasonably informed when making business
decisions, and holding that allegations of duty of care breaches are difficult to substantiate
because they are adjudicated under a gross negligence standard).
13. Delaware law’s duty of loyalty is also not codified in statute and is derived from case
law. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987)
(holding that directors have “an obligation to refrain from conduct which would injure the
corporation and its stockholders or deprive them of profit or advantage. In short, directors
must eschew any conflict between duty and self-interest.”).
14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 161(2018); but see NYSE Listed Co. Manual
§312.03(c)(2015) (requiring shareholder approval if the issuance of new shares equals or
exceeds 20% of the outstanding stock).
15. Unless otherwise stated, shareholders are assumed to possess common stock or other
classes of stock entitling them to vote. Share ownership also entails other rights such as
instigating derivative lawsuits and receiving dividends, but these rights are not discussed in
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in political elections, the dominant standard in corporate elections is the
statutory voting of one-vote one-share.16 Shareholder approval is required
for some essential matters. Shareholders must vote annually to elect the
board of directors.17 Shareholders must approve management proposals such
as bylaw changes,18 equity compensation plans,19 fundamental changes
(amendments to the charter,20 mergers with other companies,21 substantial
sales of a corporation’s assets22) and other matters not expressly prohibited
in statutes.23 Shareholders may unilaterally propose changing bylaws24 and
make proposals for voting at an annual meeting.25 However, a corporation’s
board of directors can exclude any shareholder proposals related to thirteen
substantive areas that the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) has
decided should not be determined by shareholders.26 In recent years proxy
this Comment.
16. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a)(2018) (providing that one-share one-vote is the
default rule “unless otherwise provided in the certification of incorporation”); see also Grant
M Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder
Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 447 (2008) (proclaiming that one share, one-vote is
“the ‘most basic statutory rule’ of [corporate] voting”).
17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b)(2018); see also id. at §216 (making a plurality of
votes necessary for election, but permitting corporations to set a higher standard through either
the charter or the adoption of a unilateral shareholder proposal).
18. See id. at § 109(a) (allowing shareholders to unilaterally change bylaws and stating
that the directors’ powers to amend bylaws “shall not divest the stockholders . . . nor limit
their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.”).
19. NYSE Listed Co. Manual § 312.03(a); see also id. at § 312.03(b) (requiring that a
new issuance of stock compensation greater than 1% of the total must receive a majority of
all shares present).
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1)(2018).
21. Id. at § 251(c). But see id. at §251(f), § 253 (stating that shareholder votes are not
required for a small-scale merger—merger in which the acquirer takes less than 20% of the
survivor’s common stock—nor a short-form merger—merger in which the acquirer already
owns more than 90% of the subsidiary target).
22. Id. at § 271(a).
23. Id. at § 215(c).
24. Id. at § 109.
25. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)-(e) (permitting a shareholder to make a proposal for
voting at an annual meeting if she has owned $2000 worth of shares for at least 1-year, the
proposal is less than 500-words, and it is submitted at least 120 days before the anniversary
date of the company’s last annual meeting); but see Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10,
115th Cong. § 844 (proposing, under a House-approved bill, more restrictive eligibility
requirements for a shareholder to make proposals, including increasing the holding period
from 1-year to 3-years, changing the minimum holding amount from $2000 to 1% of a
company’s shares, prohibiting proposals by proxy, and increasing the percentage of required
previous support for a proposal resubmission).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i).
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access27 has grown amongst S&P 500-listed companies from about 1% in
2014 to over 60% in 2017.28
Voting occurs at officially-sanctioned shareholder meetings, which are
either annual or special.29 An annual meeting, as the name implies, must
occur once per year (typically in the spring30) so that shareholders may meet
in-person,31 inquire about the corporation’s performance, and vote on a list
of pre-set topics such as the election of directors.32 A special meeting, in
contrast, is called when shareholders must approve a proposal such as a
pending merger that cannot wait until the next annual meeting.
Delaware’s formalistic law determines which shareholders are eligible
to vote at meetings. The board of directors must declare a “record date” that
“shall not be more than 60 nor less than 10 days” before a meeting.33 Only
registered shareholders on this date are deemed “record owners” and only
they may vote.34 Record owners are also the only persons entitled to other
27. Proxy access refers to bylaws granting shareholders the right to propose nominees
for the board of directors despite SEC restrictions.
28. BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS & PWC, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW (2d ed.
2017), http://proxypulse.broadridge.com/proxypulse/_assets/docs/broadridge-2017-proxy-se
ason-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4YG-WC88].
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212; see id. at § 211(a),(d) (specifying that meetings are, by
default, determined by the board of directors, but the corporation may specify in its charter or
bylaws whether another person such as a senior officer or shareholder may call meetings); see
also id. at § 222(a) (stating that the board of directors is also responsible for notifying
shareholders about the applicable place, particular date, and purposes of a meeting, although
the corporation can choose to delegate this responsibility differently).
30. See Staff, WELCOME TO PROXY SEASON: A PRIMER ON PROXY STATEMENTS AND
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS, FINRA (2016), https://www.finra.org/investors/welcome-proxy-
season-primer-proxy-statements-and-shareholder-meetings [https://perma.cc/N64T4MWF],
(explaining that spring is the most common season for annual meetings because companies
typically schedule them to coincide with the end of the company’s fiscal year, which often
coincides with the calendar year).
31. But see BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS & PWC, supra note 28 (surveying the
trends in shareholder meetings and finding that the while the vast majority of annual
shareholder meetings are still held in-person, virtual-only meetings are becoming more
common with 163 out of 3379 meetings in 2017 being virtual-only, a 33.6% increase from
2016).
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b); see New York Stock Exchange Listed Company
Manual §302.00 (stating that a listed company must hold an annual meeting during each fiscal
year).
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213.
34. Id. at § 219; see also id. at § 217(a) (applying the record date to shareholders with a
fiduciary duty); see also Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 494 (Del. 1989)
(recognizing the corporation’s right to “rely upon record ownership, not beneficial ownership,
in determining who is entitled to notice of and to vote” at shareholder meetings); see also Id.
(stating that “[i]n dealing with its stockholders a Delaware corporation need not look beyond
the registered [record] owners”).
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privileges such as appraisal rights.35 The record date aids voting operations
because it provides the corporation and shareholders with certainty about the
electoral roll.36 This certainty is necessary for corporations to comply with
SEC rules for distributing the voting instructions and proxy materials37
critical for attaining quorum at meetings.38
Before any meeting, the corporation must appoint at least one inspector
who takes an oath to impartially conduct the voting process.39 The
inspector’s role is ministerial rather than judicial. He is responsible for
deciding the poll closing time and officially counting the vote.40 He is given
significant deference in validating voting materials.41 Beyond these
requirements, Delaware law is extremely vague about counting votes,
especially in close contests. In a disputed vote, the courts are responsible for
adjudicating claims and determining equitable remedies.42
These are the fundamental laws and regulations defining the
relationship between the board of directors and shareholders of a
corporations. They are formalistic and intended to give clear guidance.
However, as Section B illustrates, their formality is often undone by the
complex reality of shareholder voting.
B. Shareholder Voting’s Shortcomings
Contemporary voting laws outline a corporate governance system
epitomizing republicanism. Shareholders are the constituents, directors are
the representatives. The shareholder constituents vote whether to re-elect
their director representatives. Delaware courts have repeatedly recognized
35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a),(b) (making a record owner shareholder eligible
for appraisal rights only if she does not in favor of the merger and continuously holds her
shares).
36. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1227, 1233 (2008); see also Enstar Corp., 535 A.2d at 1354-55 (holding that since
shareholders enjoy the benefits of “street name” ownership, they must also bear the burden of
establishing record ownership).
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2(b)(2)-(3) (requiring that a corporation give shareholders
proxy statements, which allow a shareholder to authorize another person or entity to vote at
the meeting on her behalf).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (stating that the default quorum is 50% of all voting
shares present in person or represented in proxy, but a corporation may raise or lower it to a
minimum of one-third of such shares in its charter).
39. Id. at § 231.
40. Id.
41. See id. at § 231(d) (allowing an inspector to use proxy materials—paper and
electronic—and other information for reconciling proxies and ballots that belong to street
name owners).
42. Id. at § 225; Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 494 (Del. 1989).
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the importance of shareholder democracy.43 Voting is sacrosanct. Despite
their extensive legal authority, directors cannot interfere with the voting
process because it is the “ideological underpinning upon which the
legitimacy of [their] power rests.”44
In practice, the governance system is broken. Obstacles have created a
“noisy, imprecise, and disturbingly opaque” arrangement.45 Definitively
knowing all shareholders is impossible. Tracking ownership is next to
impossible. Some votes are counted, others are not. Shareholders vote when
they should not and over-voting is typical. Savvy investors routinely bend
the rules to their advantage. Fundamentally, corporations and shareholder
cannot confidently trust election results.
These major problems have several causes. The modern dependence
on street name ownership creates immense complexity. This complexity
hinders accurate voter identification and has partly facilitated the dominance
of U.S. equity markets by institutional investors. These investors vote more
frequently and have more influence than retail investors, but their focus on
pooled funds has left them more dependent on voting to express displeasure
with a company. The vagaries of vote counting also lead to imperfect and
impossible to verify results.
(a) Street Name
A shareholder’s claim to voting rights is only as valid as her claim to
stock ownership. Unfortunately, validating ownership claims today is often
a challenge. Before addressing the current system and its ills, however, it is
important to understand the prior practice.
From the founding of the earliest corporations in the 17th-century until
the late 1960’s, stock ownership depended on paper.46 A person who bought
a share of stock received a physical paper certificate that designated her as
43. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003); Williams v. Geier, 671
A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992); Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
44. See Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp. 564 A.2d 615, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(establishing the Blasius-standard, which requires a board to demonstrate a compelling
justification when it interferes with a stockholder vote and later affirmed by the Delaware
Supreme Court in MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003)). But see City
of Westland Police & Fire Retirement System v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., 1 A.3d 281, 289
(Del. 2010) (holding that the Blasius standard does not apply when a shareholder seeks
information about a board’s discretionary decision to refuse to accept the resignations of
directors who failed to receive majority support).
45. Kahan & Rock, supra note 36.
46. Westfries Archief, The Oldest Share, https://www.westfriesarchief.nl/historie/them
a-s/geld-en-handel/the-oldest-share [https://perma.cc/46MM-33SW].
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the share’s beneficial owner.47 If a shareholder sold her share, the trade only
settled when the buyer took physical possession of the certificate to become
the new beneficial owner.48 This clear-cut paper paradigm of the past worked
remarkably well for centuries. Ownership was definite and tangible.
Gradually though, shareholder behavior changed and new technology
emerged enabling exponentially more transactions. Trading volumes grew
and turnover rates steadily increased. Paper-based ownership became
untenable. By the late 1960s, Wall Street faced the infamous Paperwork
Crisis in which back offices became so overwhelmed with backlogged filing
work that the NYSE opened only four days per week (closing on
Wednesdays).49
To overcome the Crisis, financial institutions and the SEC jointly
reformed the system. They moved away from the traditional paper paradigm
towards electronic automation and, more importantly for shareholder voting,
the current system of multi-tiered custodial “street name” ownership50—an
indisputable mess for tracking beneficial ownership51—that represents about
85% of all U.S. publicly traded shares.52
Today, an investor who buys a share of stock never sees, receives, or
worries about safekeeping a physical certificate. Instead, corporations
deposit their issued stock certificates at one institution—the Depository
Trust Corporation (DTC)53—which tracks and holds the certificates in its
vaults, while nominally owning and clearing them through its nominee Cede
& Co.54 The DTC’s “participants” (typically banks and brokerages) buy
47. Tim Fernholz, The Solution to Wall Street’s 1960’s Paperwork Crisis Could Also
Save Bitcoin, QUARTZ (Mar. 13, 2019), https://qz.com/370553/what-the-cigar-chomping-
schleppers-of-1960s-wall-street-mean-for-bitcoins-future/; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3
(defining the beneficial owner as the party with the legal power to vote or transfer the stock).
48. Id.
49. Staff, When Paper Paralyzed Wall Street: Remembering the 1960s Paperwork Crisis,
FINRA (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.finra.org/investors/when-paper-paralyzed-wall-street-
remembering-1960s-paperwork-crisis, https://perma.cc/5PCT-29EG.
50. See generally John C. Wilcox et al., “Street Name” Registration & The Proxy
Solicitation Process, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 12-3 (2006) https://www.sec.gov/co
mments/4-537/4537-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/92TH-3P7S] (defining the street name owner as
the third-party such as a bank or brokerage that nominally owns stock, but executes trades and
holds the stock on behalf of the beneficial owner).
51. Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 1237-39.
52. Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Pain, The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership,
HARV. BUS. R. (2017).
53. The DTC is a technically a subsidiary of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation
(DTCC), which also owns the National Securities Clearing Corporation. For purposes of this
Comment, the distinction between DTC and DTCC is ignored.
54. Fernholz, supra note 47; see also DTCC, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT: FROM WHERE WE
STAND (2016), http://www.dtcc.com/annuals/2016/index.html#business [https://perma.cc/X4
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these certificates, while the DTC tracks their holdings for a fee on their
behalf.55 An investor purchases her shares from a participant, which transfers
beneficial ownership rights to the investor by giving her a fungible interest
in its holdings at the DTC.56 The participant becomes custodian of the
shareholder’s shares, while providing fee-based services such as account
management, trade settlement, and information distribution (including
meeting notifications and proxy forms).57 In the simplest scenario of “street
name” custodianship, the DTC is the custodian for the participants’ shares,
the participants are the street name custodians for the shareholders’ shares,
and shareholders anonymously trade their fungible street name shares with
one another. Corporations are removed from the trading and tracking
process, leaving the DTC, its participants, and shareholders responsible for
coordinating amongst themselves.
Street name’s complexity yields some benefits. Shareholders get a
degree of convenience that is impossible in a paper-based world.58 Street
name supports a massively lucrative industry with the four-largest custodians
in 2017 managing assets worth $103.3 trillion, growing 7%59 since 2016 and
244% since 2007.60 It is effective for transferring ownership and settling
trades. Today, over three billion shares per day are routinely exchanged on
the NYSE61 and holding periods average, by some estimates, 8.3 months.62
ST-9992] (reporting that the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, DTC’s holding
company, processed $1.503 quadrillion worth of securities in 2016).
55. See generally DTC, FEE GUIDE, www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/fee-
guides/dtcfeeguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/692Q-RLPD] (outlining the DTC’s fee schedule);
see also DTCC, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT: FROM WHERE WE STAND (2017) (showing that
DTCC’s revenue from its services grew 7% to reach $1.712-billion in 2016).
56. Fernholz, supra note 47.
57. See Trefis Team, What Proportion of Revenues for the 4 Largest Custody Banks
Came From Custody Banking Fees in 2016?, NASDAQ (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nasdaq
.com/article/what-proportion-of-revenues-for-the-4-largest-custody-banks-came-from-
custody-banking-fees-in-2016-cm750836 [https://perma.cc/3QPY-F9MG] (reporting that in
2016, the four largest custodian banks cumulatively earned about $18-billion in custodian fees
with the two-largest custodian banks earning about 50% of their total revenue from such fees).
58. Wilcox et al., supra note 50.
59. Trefis Team, Largest Custody Banks Saw Asset Bases Swell Almost 7% in Last Year,
FORBES (Jan 27, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/05/08/largest-
custody-banks-saw-asset-bases-swell-almost-7-in-last-year/#277d72a58f5d [https://perma.
cc/6MJD-P6QR].
60. Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 1238.
61. Market Data Center: Markets Diary: Closing Snapshot, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2018),
http://www.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3021-tradingdiary2.html [https://perma.cc/3H8C-
4A7Q].
62. Michael W. Roberge et al., Lengthening the Investment Time Horizon, MFS (2017).
But see Mark Roe, Are Stock Markets Really Becoming More Short Term?, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Feb. 21, 2013), (contending that the perceived change in the average holding
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In comparison, in 1968 the daily trading of just twelve million shares and an
average holding period of four years63 triggered the Paperwork Crisis on
Wall Street. However, street name’s convenience has led to problematic
trends.
(i) Voter Identification
Mechanically, identifying the beneficial owners of street name shares
is akin to taking a Dante’s Inferno-like journey. Once a record date is
announced, a corporation’s directors contact the DTC which then notifies its
participants holding the corporation’s stock. Ideally, participants work in a
timely manner64 to check their records and give the DTC a list of beneficial
shareholders.65 The DTC then passes this list to the corporation, which often
uses a proxy services company such as Broadridge to manage proxy
distribution. Complicating matters, the street name system is plagued by a
process dubbed “piggybacking” in which smaller banks or brokers deposit
their shares at larger ones.66 Each level of piggybacking requires another
round of notifying, checking, and contacting custodians further removed
from the DTC and the corporation. Piggybacking may repeat many times,
creating an overlapping and multi-tiered knot of custodial ownership that is
difficult, if not impossible, to untangle.
Even when a beneficial owner is found, voting discrepancies ensue. In
a variety of circumstances collectively called “empty voting” a
shareholder—by mistake or misconduct—is separated from her beneficial
ownership.67 All empty voting undermines the fundamental concept of
corporate governance theory. That shareholders are the people best suited to
vote on essential corporate matters because they are the most economically
interested constituents.
In a common case of empty voting, a shareholder buys or sells shares
duration is caused by a small percentage of shareholders trading much more frequently, while
most shareholder holding behaviors are similar to the past).
63. See NYSE Annual Reported Volume, Turnover Rate, Reported Trades,
NYSEDATA.COM, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mo
de=table&key=2206&category=4 (accessed Jan. 31, 2018).
64. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1(b)(1) (requiring brokers to respond to the DTC’s requests
within 7-business days); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2(b)(1)(i) (requiring bankers to respond to the
DTC’s requests within 1-business day).
65. See id. at § 240.14b-1(b)(1)(i) (requiring banks and brokers to inform the DTC of
beneficial owners, not counting other banks and brokers, within 7-business days).
66. Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 1237-39.
67. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006); Susan Christoffersen et
al., Vote Trading and Information Aggregation, 62 J. FIN. 2897 (2007).
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during the interlude between the record date and the meeting date. If a
shareholder buys her shares during that interlude, she has no voting rights
despite her exposure to the company’s future. If a shareholder sells her
shares during the interlude, she has voting rights but no economic interest in
the outcome.68
In some intentional empty voting practices, savvy investors exploit the
complexity of ownership tracking for hedging and profiteering purposes.
Sometimes they purposely borrow shares immediately before the record date
and repay the shares immediately afterwards. This gives them voting rights
but no economic exposure to the market. Under calculated uses of equity
derivatives and synthetic transactions, many hedge funds imitate economic
rights while avoiding disclosure regulations triggered by beneficial
ownership.69
As an example, in 2004, Mylan Laboratories, Inc. sought to acquire
King Pharmaceuticals, Inc., pending approval by Mylan’s stockholders.70 At
the time of the announcement, the hedge fund Perry Corporation already
owned a significant stake in King, but hedged its position by acquiring and
shorting71 Mylan shares in case Mylan’s stock price fell. First, Perry
accumulated 10% of Mylan’s shares after the markets closed to avoid SEC
disclosure requirements. Then, Perry entered into swaps transactions
protecting itself from a drop in Mylan’s stock price. Perry, unlike other
Mylan shareholders, established an empty voting position so it could vote
Mylan’s shares without any economic repercussions, risks, or stakes in the
outcome. Regardless of whether Mylan’s share price fell or rose, Perry had
insulated its investments.
In other cases, empty voting arises when borrowing and lending leads
to over-voting and multiple ownership claims for one share. A loaned share
maintains voting rights. If a lender fails to track the temporary ownership
change, then both the lender and borrower could vote via the same share
68. See generally Hu & Black, supra note 67 (describing the rise of empty voting and its
consequences). But see Alon Brav & Richmond D. Mathews, Empty Voting and the Efficiency
of Corporate Governance, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 289 (2011) (supporting empty voting as an
efficient system because voting rights are priced to their highest value and minority
shareholders have the opportunity to profit by selling or lending their votes).
69. See generally Michael C. Shouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure,
15 STAN. J.L. BUS. FIN. 127 (2009).
70. Press Release, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, SEC Charges Perry Corp. With
Disclosure Violations in Vote Buying Scheme, (Jul. 21, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/pr
ess/2009/2009-165.htm [https://perma.cc/PN97-DGE4].
71. The process of (hopefully) making profit by borrowing stock from a lender, selling it
to others at a high price, pocketing the proceeds, and then buying the stock at a lower price in
the future to return to the lender.
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without anyone noticing.72 The DTC’s “chill” restrictions add more
confusion to this situation. The DTC implements a “chill” to stop tracking
share ownership when it recognizes an issue with a specific security. Issues
that could trigger “chills” include legal, regulatory, or operational problems
with a security. If a stock-based merger is about to close, then the DTC will
“chill” tracking trades in that stock during the final three days before the
merger closes, although trading continues.73
In 2013, David H. Murdock, the Chairman, CEO, and controlling
shareholder of Dole Foods, Inc. (the world’s largest producer of fruits and
vegetables) used share lending empty voting and DTC chill restrictions to
his advantage. Murdock took the company private in a single-step merger
by giving $13.50 as consideration for each Dole share.74 Dole shareholders
claimed Murdock bought the shares for too little. The resulting class action
lawsuit led to a settlement that gave an additional $2.74, plus interest, for
each of the 36,793,758 outstanding shares in the class.75 Unfortunately, valid
claims arrived for 49,164,415 shares, representing 12,370,657 or 33.6%
more shares than Dole had outstanding!76 Upon investigation, the attorneys
discovered that the extra shares had resulted from a DTC “chill.” In the three
days before the merger closed, the DTC had ceased tracking ownership,
despite nearly 32-million trades and 2.9-million short sales occurring during
that period.77 Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster, in reviewing the Dole fiasco,
found that “the problems raised . . . appear endemic to the depository system
and hence [will] likely infect every claims process.”78
As these examples demonstrate, street name’s dominance hinders
accurate voter identification and tracking.
(ii) Institutional Investors
Street name79 has facilitated a notable change in who owns stocks.
72. Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 1237-39; NYSE Information Memo 04–58,
“Supervision of Proxy Activities and Over-voting” (Nov. 5, 2004).
73. Steven D. Solomon, Dole Case Illustrates Problems in Shareholder System, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/business/dealbook/dole-case-
illustrates-problems-in-shareholder-system.html [https://perma.cc/9US6-5D42].
74. In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, 1 (Del. Ch. 2015)
(mem.), https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=252690 [https://perma.cc/
5UHG-YXWY].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 5-6.
78. Id. at 16.
79. See Patrick Jahnke, Voice versus Exit: The Causes and Consequence of Increasing
Shareholder Concentration (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302
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Institutional shareholders80 now dominate retail shareholders.81 Since 1950,
institutional investors’ share of U.S. equities has grown from approximately
6.1%82 to at least 70.0%.83 Among large companies, institutional investors
own more than 74% of equity.84 Simultaneously, since 1950 the NYSE’s
market capitalization has expanded more than 2,000% from $142.7-billion85
to $18.9-trillion!86 Institutional investors not only own a larger share of U.S.
equities than in the past, but the market itself is significantly more vast.
The institutional industry itself is extremely concentrated too. The ten
largest institutional investors hold over 30% of the equity listed on the S&P
500.87 By themselves, the so-called “Big Three” firms—BlackRock, State
Street, and Vanguard—manage more than 90% of all assets in equity funds
and are cumulatively the largest shareholders of 438 of the 500 firms listed
on the S&P 500.88 This dominance of U.S. equity has changed voting
practices.
Voting rates are up because institutional investors vote their shares
7058 [https://perma.cc/5PTT-X2AS] (noting that the growing popularity of mutual funds and
exchange traded funds (ETFs) has also played a significant role in changing stock ownership
trends).
80. Large organizations such as pension funds, endowments, mutual funds, etc. that make
significant investments on stock exchanges on behalf of its members. See Serdar Çelik &
Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and Ownership Engagement, 2013 OECD J. 93 (2014)
(describing institutional investors and identifying 7 features and 19 choices that differentiate
their business models).
81. An individual investor who buys and sells securities her personal account and not
another organization.
82. The Conference Board, 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset
Allocation and Portfolio Composition Table 10, 22 (2010).
83. BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, INC & PWC, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW (2d
ed. 2017), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/governance-insights-center/publications/assets/pwc-
proxypulse-2017-proxy-season-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8SL-PEAE].
84. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 2017 U.S.
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 3 (2018), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Pub
lication_Review_and_Analysis_of_2017_US_Shareholder_Activism.pdf [https://perma.cc/E
JZ6-P7TR] (defining a large company as one with a market capitalization exceeding $2
billion).
85. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN
ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION TABLE 10, 22 (2010).
86. WORLD FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, MARKET STATISTICS - SEPTEMBER 2016, (Feb.
15, 2018), https://www.world-exchanges.org/focus/index.php/in-every-issue/statistics/marke
t-statistics/43-domestic-market-capitalisation [https://perma.cc/UU5W-LW7W]. The over
2000% growth also doesn’t include the NASDAQ, which had a 2016 market capitalization of
$7.6-trillion and was not founded until 1971. Id.
87. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 84, at 2.
88. Jan Fichtner & Eelke M. Heemskerk, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index
Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. &
POLITICS, 298-326 (2017).
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much more frequently than retail investors. In 2017, retail and institutional
shareholders voted 29% and 91%, respectively, of their shares; about 88%
of all votes cast came from institutional owners.89 Compared to diffuse retail
investors, institutional investors suffer from fewer collective action
problems. Numerous empirical studies show that greater concentration
amongst fewer shareholders means that management proposals face more
scrutiny.90 As Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Commissioner from 2008 until 2015,
acknowledged, “[i]nstitutional investors . . . have an important role in
monitoring corporate governance issues” and they can determine outcomes
“[g]iven the [high] percentage of company stock held by institutions, and the
low participation rates of individual shareholders in corporate elections.”91
As a result of their power, institutional shareholders have recently tended to
make more proposals related to environmental, social, and governance
causes. In 2017 alone, hundreds of proposals were made that related to
promoting environmental protection, diversity on boards, the gender pay
gap, and workplace discrimination.92 Over the last 20 years, institutional
investors have also waged many successful campaigns against structural
obstacles impeding affirmative shareholder rights.93
Still, institutional investors encounter greater limitations than retail
investors in some circumstances. Institutional investors’ business models
89. BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, INC & PWC, supra note 83.
90. Randall S. Thomas & Patrick C. Tricker, Shareholder Voting in Proxy Contests for
Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections and Management Proposals: A Review
of the Empirical Literature, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 9, 71-124 (2017) (reviewing empirical studies
on management proposals related to mergers, auditor ratifications, anti-takeover measures,
and compensation, and concluding that institutional investors have led to greater shareholder
suspicion and due diligence when considering many types of management proposals).
91. Luis A. Aguilar, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Institutional
Investors: Power and Responsibility, Address at J. Mack Robinson College of Business,
Center for Economic Analysis of Risk Workshop (Apr. 19, 2013).
92. Ronald O. Muller et al., Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 Proxy
Season, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (July 29, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/sh
areholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2017-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/GU4F-
8F2Q]; see also Joann S. Lublin, New York State Fund Snubs All-Male Boards, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-state-fund-snubs-all-male-boards-
1521538321 [https://perma.cc/G4MG-8VFQ] (reporting that New York’s leading state
pension fund will oppose the re-election of boards at hundreds of US corporations that lack a
single woman on their boards because only 16.5% of directorships are held by women at
Russel 3000 companies).
93. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, “EMPTY VOTING” AND OTHER FAULT LINES
UNDERMINING SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: THE NEW HUNTING GROUND FOR HEDGE FUNDS,
M&A DEAL COMMENTARY (Sep. 18, 2007), https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pu
b1878_1.Commentary.Empty.Voting.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSG2-4ZFN] (showcasing the
efforts made to increase shareholder democracy in the last 20 years).
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depend on pooled funds.94 Typically, a shareholder can express her
displeasure with a corporation in one of two distinct ways: sell stock or vote
against management. In the early 20th century shareholders much more
frequently exercised their power by selling shares rather than using the
“rarely exercised” right to vote.95 However, pooled funds inherently restrict
an investor’s ability to sell shares. Institutional shareholders, unlike retail
shareholders, are therefore much more reliant on voting to communicate
their displeasure.
The breadth of an institutional investor’s holdings also impedes
effective voting. A large institutional investor may own shares in thousands
of different companies, meaning it has many thousands of proposals to
consider each year.96 These investors have few incentives to spend the
necessary time, money, and resources to perform adequate due diligence on
every proposal.97 Consequently, an industry of proxy advisors has emerged.
Proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass
Lewis analyze corporate proposals and offer recommendations on how to
vote. Although the ability of ISS and Glass Lewis to change voting outcomes
is difficult to quantify, proxy advisors are certainly influential.98 As
institutional investors remain dominant, non-shareholder proxy advisories
will remain important.
(b) Vote Counting
Adding to the street name problems is a faulty vote counting process.
A process that “promotes certainty and speed over accuracy and
94. Patrick Jahnke, supra note 79.
95. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 784
(2005).
96. See Carol J. Loomis, BlackRock: The $4.3 trillion Force, FORTUNE, July 7, 2014,
http://fortune.com/2014/07/07/blackrock-larry-fink [https://perma.cc/ZDY6-GCUA/]
(estimating that in 2012 alone, BlackRock received 129,814 management and shareholder
proposals for consideration at shareholder meetings).
97. See, e.g., Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 354 (2009) (“Institutional investors,
despite having greater capacity to monitor and gather information, may have too small a stake
in a company or too limited industry expertise to monitor it actively.”); see also Paul Rose,
The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 897 (2007) (“Unless an institutional
investor believes that it can conduct research for less, or that more expensive but discerning
research will enable it to obtain better returns (after subtracting its own research costs), the
investor may be better off outsourcing its corporate governance research.”).
98. See generally Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy
Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869 (2010) (analyzing the influence of proxy
advisory firms on voting outcomes and finding that an ISS recommendation flips, on average,
about 6% to 10% of shareholder votes).
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perfection.”99
History’s largest and most expensive proxy contest100 aptly
demonstrates this reality. In the summer of 2017, Nelson Peltz, co-founder
of Trian Fund Management, sought a seat on the board of Procter & Gamble
(P&G).101 The proxy contest was heated. By joining the board, Peltz argued
he would enact profound changes to improve the company’s languid
growth.102 In response, P&G argued that Peltz, a notorious activist investor,
only sought a board position to facilitate breaking up the firm. Trian and
P&G spent at least $25 million and $100 million, respectively, on their
months-long campaigns.103 Finally, the annual meeting arrived. The initial
count showed Peltz had lost the election by 6.15 million votes, a margin of
only 0.2% out of P&G’s over 2.5 billion outstanding shares.104 Peltz
appealed for an independent recount, which found he had actually won by
42,000 votes; a margin of just 0.0016%!105 The uncertainty continued when
another recount found Peltz lost by about 500,000 votes.106 After months of
embarrassing publicity and recounts, P&G refused to officially concede
defeat, but added Peltz to the board in recognition of his substantial support
amongst shareholders.107 No one definitively knows and no one ever will
know the actual voting results. Even one of the world’s wealthiest, most
powerful, and most renowned corporations could not escape the flaws of
contemporary vote counting.
99. Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 1235.
100. David Benoit, Trian Launches Proxy Fight Against Procter & Gamble, WALL ST. J.
(July 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trian-to-launch-proxy-fight-against-p-g-1500
264242 [https://perma.cc/NZY2-9GZZ].
101. See PROCTER & GAMBLE CO., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT (2017) (reporting that P&G,
owner of popular brands such as Tide, Gillette, and Pampers, is one of the world’s leading
providers of consumer-packaged goods with a $221.8-billion market capitalization and $65.1-
billion in net sales in 2017).
102. TRIAN FUND MANAGEMENT, L.P., REVITALIZE P&G TOGETHER: VOTE THE WHITE
PROXY CARD (2017),
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://trianpartners.com/content/uploads/2017/01/Trian-PG-White-Paper-
9.6.17-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMD3-USGQ].
103. Chris Isidore & David Goldman, Procter & Gamble Declares Victory in Expensive
Proxy Fight, CNN: CNN MONEY BLOG, (Oct. 10, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/10/n
ews/companies/procter-gamble-proxy-fight/index.html [https://perma.cc/H3GN-R787].
104. Sharon Terlep & David Benoit, P&G Says Nelson Peltz Lost Bid for Board Seat by
About 0.2% of Share Count, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/p-g-
says-nelson-peltz-lost-bid-for-board-seat-by-about-0-2-of-share-count-1508190889 [https://
perma.cc/5BS8-C3VN].
105. Sharon Terlep & David Benoit, P&G Concedes Proxy Fights, Adds Nelson Peltz to
Its Board, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/p-g-concedes-proxy-
fight-adds-nelson-peltz-to-its-board-1513377485 [https://perma.cc/3KDN-DL54].
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Management’s influence also affects voting outcomes. An empirical
statistical study of close contests—ones falling within a 5% margin of
victory—finds that voting results disproportionately swing in favor of
management.108 Management-sponsored proposals are “overwhelmingly
more likely to win a corporate vote by a very small amount than lose by a
very small amount——to a degree that cannot occur by chance.”109 In
contrast, shareholder-sponsored proposals (which are non-binding and
precatory) show no irregularity in outcomes.110 This suggests some
inappropriate manipulation.111
The exact methods of manipulation are unclear. In close contests
management may possess high-quality information about the vote count and
intensify its campaign112 knowing that the corporation will reimburse
expenses.113 In some cases, superstar managers with outsize influence may
use their clout to affect the voting process. After all, management often has
clear compensation incentives to sway voters. One study of 103 buyout
transactions between 2003 and 2009 found that an average deal gave
management $64.3 million in compensation and a 21.9% ownership stake in
the new company.114
The 2011 leveraged buyout of the apparel company J. Crew Group, Inc.
exemplifies how a manager’s influence may affect outcomes. J. Cr few’s
legendary CEO Mickey Drexler—nicknamed the “Merchant Prince”115 of
retail for his successful stewardships of Gap and J. Crew—conspired for
weeks with private equity firms TPG Capital and Leonard Green & Partners
(LGP) to affect a leveraged buyout of the company for $3 billion. In a highly
controversial process, Drexler hid many damaging procedural facts from
108. Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
159 (2008); see also Yair Listokin, Does Shareholder Voting Reflect Shareholder
Preferences, UC Berkeley Law and Economics Workshop 4 (2007) (finding that in proxy
contests management wins more close contests than it loses, but does not to the same degree
as in other voting contests).
109. Id. at 161.
110. Id. at 173-5.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 173 (finding that the probability of the study’s results occurring by chance
is roughly one in one-billion).
113. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (2008) (holding
that a board may expend corporate funds to reimburse expenses in disputes involving policy).
114. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Form Over Substance? The Value of
Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, DEL. J. CORP. L. 849 (2011).
115. See Vanessa Friedman & Julie Creswell, Mickey Drexler Steps Down as Chief of J.
Crew, Ending an Era, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/bus
iness/jcrew-mickey-drexler.html [https://perma.cc/2UTY-29BF] (reporting that, as of 2017,
J. Crew is reaching the brink of bankruptcy and Drexler has stepped down as CEO amidst
years of declining sales and hundreds of job cuts).
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shareholders. Drexler waited seven weeks to notify the board of his dealings
with TPG and LGP, he shared private company information to inform the
private equity firms’ offer, and he exerted his personal influence with the
board to negotiate a $2 price reduction from the initial $45.50 offer.116 With
Drexler’s persuasion, the deal closed and he received compensation of $200
million in cash and an 8.8% stake in the company worth $100 million.117
Despite J. Crew’s dismal performance since the deal’s closing, TPG and
LGP have paid themselves nearly $750 million in dividends and fees.”
Whether caused by issues with street name, voter identification, or vote
counting, the modern systems of shareholder voting and share ownership are
defective. New tools and systems must emerge. Just as reform was needed
when a purely paper-based paradigm created the Paperwork Crisis, Wall
Street must again revise its ways. The legitimacy of corporate governance
will erode as long as the dysfunction of shareholder voting persists.
Fortunately, blockchain may offer a solution.
PART II: THE FUTURE
The hype surrounding blockchain technology is real. Seemingly every
industry and every person is “buzzing about the potential for the Blockchain
to revolutionize . . . well everything.”118 Studies predict that by 2027, 10%
of the world’s gross domestic product will be stored on blockchain
technology.119 Silicon Valley leaders describe blockchain as “the distributed
trust network that the Internet always needed and never had.”120 From selling
116. Steven Davidoff Solomon, J. Crew Buyout Raises Questions, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/j-crew-buyout-
raises-questions/ [https://perma.cc/2LBC-LHJU].
117. Id.
118. GOLDMAN SACHS, EMERGING THEME RADAR, (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.goldmansa
chs.com/our-thinking/pages/macroeconomic-insights-folder/what-if-i-told-you/report.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/CC3L-A875].
119. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, DEEP SHIFT TECHNOLOGY TIPPING POINTS AND SOCIETAL
IMPACT, 24 (Sept. 2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC15_Technological_Tip
ping_Points_report_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7UH-RA4W].
120. Brian Fung, Marc Andreessen: In 20 Years, we’ll talk about Bitcoin like we talk about
the Internet today, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH BLOG (May 21, 2014), https://www.washin
gtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/05/21/marc-andreessen-in-20-years-well-talk-about
-bitcoin-like-we-talk-about-the-internet-today/?utm_term=.d272a20b71c4 [https://perma.cc/
ARH2-XN9C].
2018] BLOCKCHAIN & SHARING VOTING 425
CrytpoKitties121 to redefining property rights,122 blockchain seemingly has
no limits.
Of course, that’s just the hype. Revolutionary changes are not
guaranteed. Yet in a modern world that produces 2.5 quintillion bytes of
data per day,123 blockchain promises a future of more transparent, tamper-
proof, accurate, and secure digital recordkeeping. A new era for a world
overwhelmed by data.
A. Introduction to Blockchain
(a) Mechanics
Blockchain technology, at its most fundamental level, is a special
database: a so-called “trust machine.”124 Cleverly combining cryptography,
game theory, and economics, blockchain ingeniously enables recordkeeping
that anyone can access and verify, but no one can control or change.
To dispel one major misconception, blockchain is often used
synonymously and interchangeably with bitcoin—the decentralized
cryptocurrency released in January 2009 by the anonymous Satoshi
Nakamoto.125 This confluence is incorrect and short-sighted. In fact, the
initial idea for blockchain dates to at least 1991 when researchers Stuart
121. Fitz Tepper, People Have Spent Over $1M Buying Virtual Cats on the Ethereum
Blockchain, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 3, 2017) https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/03/people-have-
spent-over-1m-buying-virtual-cats-on-the-ethereum-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/YF36-K6
W4].
122. Phil Gramm & Hernando de Soto, How Blockchain Can End Poverty, WALL ST. J.:
OPINION (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-blockchain-can-end-poverty-
1516925459 [https://perma.cc/7XPK-FHEP].
123. IBM, 10 KEY MARKETING TRENDS FOR 2017 AND IDEAS FOR EXCEEDING CUSTOMER
EXPECTATIONS 3 (2017), https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=WR
L12345USEN [https://perma.cc/6GR4-Q4CL].
124. The Trust Machine: The Promise of the Blockchain, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 2015,
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/10/31/the-trust-machine [https://perma.cc/4FAP-
38P5].
125. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, (2009),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW8T-T59E]. Satoshi Nakamoto has never
been identified and it is generally believed that the name is a pseudonym for an author (or
authors) who wishes to remain anonymous. Theories abound for Nakamoto’s anonymity
ranging from the self-defensive (he wishes to avoid legal trouble for his creation or personal
safety issues since he owns 1-million bitcoin) to the purposeful (his anonymity generates
ongoing publicity and reflects bitcoin’s philosophy of total decentralizations). See Who is
Satoshi Nakamoto?, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2015, https://www.economist.com/the-
economist-explains/2015/11/02/who-is-satoshi-nakamoto [https://perma.cc/VMC2-C366]
(stating that Satoshi Nakamoto has not been heard from since 2011).
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Haber and W. Scott Stornetta first proposed methods for tamper-proofing
digital content.126 Bitcoin is one innovative, high-profile, and perhaps
politically motivated127 application of blockchain, but the underlying
blockchain technology itself is much more meaningful. Blockchain is the
internet. Bitcoin is email.
In a blockchain,128 each participant (referred to as a “node”) starts with
a blank ledger (referred to as a “block”) for recording a finite and
predetermined amount of transactional information. Nodes transact with
each other by trading assets and sharing information. With each transaction,
a node publicly announces what has occurred so that each node can
simultaneously and automatically record the transaction on its block.
Transactions continue until a block is filled.
At this point, without a blockchain, the participants in a transaction
would normally need to rely on a trusted source (for example, a bank,
government, or company) for two services. One is holding the completed
ledger. The other is preventing people from changing that ledger. This is
how most modern record-keeping systems work. If someone claims
illegitimate activity has happened (transactions are missing, values are
incorrect, or fraud has occurred), then the trusted source checks the official
record, verifies claims, and makes modifications. Such a system suffers from
several problems. The trusted source may have incorrectly recorded the
transactions or even lost the completed ledger. Another person such as a
hacker may have stolen or corrupted the ledger without the trusted source
realizing it. Perhaps the trusted source was not actually trustworthy and
126. Stuart Haber & W. Scott Stornetta, How to Time-Stamp a Digital Document, 3 J.
CRYPTOGRAPHY 99 (1991).
127. See also Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin Open Source Implementation of P2P Currency,
P2P FOUNDATION (Feb. 11, 2009, 10:27 PM), http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/forum/topics/bi
tcoin-open-source [https://perma.cc/7CDF-FWUH] (stating that “[t]he root problem with
conventional currency is all the trust that’s required to make it work. The central bank must
be trusted not to debase the currency, but the history of fiat currencies is full of breaches of
that trust.); see also Jamie Redman, Bitcoin’s Quirky Genesis Block Turns Eight Years Old
Today, BITCOIN, (Jan. 3, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoins-quirky-genesis-block-
turns-eight-years-old-today [https://perma.cc/L2NX-Z9VS] (noting that Bitcoin’s genesis
block—that is, its first block—is encoded with the London Times’s headline from January 3,
Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks,” a likely reference to Nakamoto’s distrust of
centralized banking systems).
128. This Comment only provides a high-level, simplified, and plain-English description
of blockchain mechanics. For a more technical and detailed description of blockchain the
following sources are recommended: Michael Crosby and Pradhan Pattanayak et al.,
BlockChain Technology: Beyond Bitcoin, BERKELEY SUTARDJA CENT. FOR ENTRE. & TECH.
(2015); Francois Zaninotto, The Blockchain Explained to Web Developers, Part 1: The
Theory, MARMELAB (2016), https://marmelab.com/blog/2016/04/28/blockchain-for-web-
developers-the-theory.html [https://perma.cc/4AFZ-EYGQ].
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changed the record on its own.129
The ingenuity of blockchain kicks in when addressing these inherent
imperfections of trusted sources. Instead of relying on flawed trusted
sources, blockchain enables nodes to securely hold and protect a completed
block on their own. Illicit changes are prevented by using a special type of
cryptography called a universal one-way hash function. This hash function
works by taking inputs and providing outputs based on arbitrary assignment.
For example, in a hypothetical hash function the input “r3” outputs
“29pmdsadipdasd” and the input of “12p” yields “asdnjsd1.” No rhyme or
reason exists for these input-output relationships. The only way to know
which input leads to which output is to test all potential inputs. This is a
“proof-of-work” system. If you are given an input, then it is extremely easy
to calculate the correct output. But if you are only given an output, then it is
extremely difficult and costly to determine the input. Using the simplified
hash function example, you could quickly learn that inputting “10c” always
yields the output “2ipdbme.” But if you only have the output “2ipdbme”
then you must use trial-and-error by inputting various values—”1a,” “2d5,”
“x3i,” and so on—until you found the only input (“10c”) leading to the
“2ipdbme” output.
Each completed block receives a randomly predetermined output value.
Each completed block also contains three input values that, when combined,
must equal the output value. Only two of these three input values are known.
The first is the sum of all the transactions on the filled block. The second is
a randomly predetermined value called a “nonce.” The final input value is
unknown (for this example, refer to it as the “seal number”). Through a
process known as “mining,” one of the nodes must find this missing seal
number, add it to the completed block, and announce its discovery to the
group.130 When the majority of nodes agree that the seal number is correct,
129. Many countries have the luxury of relatively trustworthy and stable governments and
institutions. However, it is important to remember that many parts of the world lack such
foundations or are prone to extraordinary uncertainty. See Maureen Farrell, Bitcoin Prices
Surge Post-Cyprus Bailout, CNN: CNN Money Blog (Mar. 28, 2013), http://money.cnn.co
m/2013/03/28/investing/bitcoin-cyprus/index.html [https://perma.cc/C7FZ-RQQ2]
(reporting about depositors in Cyprus flocking to bitcoin as Cyprus’s central bank teetered
towards default); see also Rene Chun, Big in Venezuela: Bitcoin Mining, THE ATLANTIC, Sept.
15, 2017 (reporting on the rise in bitcoin mining in Venezuela as the government’s monetary
policies led to a hyperinflation rate of 1,600% in 2017).
130. Mining seal numbers requires significant effort and computing power, so as an
incentive a blockchain gives successful miners a predetermined reward. For example, the
bitcoin blockchain program originally awarded successful miners 25 bitcoins for each mined
seal number with this reward halving every 210,000 blocks. The declining rewards simulates
a controlled currency supply and inflation rate normally managed by a central bank such as
the U.S. Federal Reserve. As of this writing, bitcoin’s reward is 12.5 bitcoin worth about
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the nodes seal the completed block, add it to the “chain” of previously filled
blocks, and proceed to the next one. The process continues indefinitely,
forming a growing chain of blocks. A blockchain.
Blockchain’s ingenuity is further demonstrated by the confidence and
security it generates. If a dishonest node changes any transaction history in
a sealed block, then that sealed block’s input value changes and the
previously discovered seal number no longer leads to the correct output
number. To conceal her actions, the dishonest node would need to identify
a new seal number through the tedious proof-of-work process. However,
while she is trying to discover a new seal number to create a new chain, the
other honest nodes have continued transacting and building upon the original
chain. These honest nodes produce and seal new blocks faster than the
dishonest node constructs her version. In this way, the mistakes or ill-
intentions of the few do not override the actions of the many. The honesty
of the majority outweighs the dishonesty of the minority.
(b) Weaknesses
Blockchain, like any emerging technology, has weaknesses. Ones that
must be addressed over time with complementary, supporting technologies.
This Comment does not discuss in detail blockchain’s many challenges and
their proposed or possible solutions. Instead, this Comment assesses the
essential primary weaknesses, threats, and risks inherent to any form of
blockchain.
The first and arguably most significant risk is referred to as the “51%
Attack.” This arises when a miner or mining pool seizes a majority of the
blockchain’s mining power.131 With this level of control, a majority can
launch a “hard fork” by rewriting prior blocks and generating a new chain
that the minority of nodes must follow.132 A hard fork creates a permanent
split between the original chain and the new version.133 Theoretically, a 51%
Attack is unlikely. The heart of blockchain relies on the assumption that at
any given time a majority of nodes are honest and not collusive.134 Game
theory principles discourage 51% Attacks because if a majority controls a
$100,000 for successfully mining a seal number.
131. See generally Mauro Conti et. al., A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin,
(Dec. 25, 2017) (unpublished article) (on file with ArXiv), https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.00916
[https://perma.cc/AB4Z-MZ7Q] (detailing many of the vulnerabilities of bitcoin and
blockchains generally).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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blockchain, then fewer nodes join and the blockchain’s value decreases.135
As history demonstrates, these assumptions are not always true.
In 2016, a hacker group successfully 51% Attacked the
cryptocurrencies Krypton and Shift to extort the founders for ransoms.136 In
other cases, hard forks and 51% Attacks have happened with good intentions.
Several months before the Krypton and Shift attacks, hackers exploited a
publicized vulnerability in an investment fund operating on the Ethereum
blockchain (a leading cryptocurrency and competitor of bitcoin). The
hackers seized about one-third of the fund’s holdings, representing 3.6
million Ether tokens then worth about $55 million.137 Shortly after, a heated
debate erupted amongst Ethereum nodes about how to respond to this system
breach. Some nodes wanted to hard fork and restore the lost tokens, while
others argued such a hard fork would represent an inappropriate 51% Attack
violating Ethereum’s founding principles of immutability and trust. A vote
was held. About 85% of the Ethereum community chose to execute a hard
fork and restore the lost tokens, while the dissenting 15% refused to follow
and founded Ethereum Classic.138 Ethereum and Ethereum Classic still run
in parallel today.
A lack of sensible governance is the other major risk139 of a public
blockchain. Governments and centralized institutions, despite their flaws,
provide powerful processes for making decisions and resolving disputes.
Bitcoin’s history as a public blockchain is telling of what could happen
without a centralized authority. As bitcoin has rapidly grown, developers
have engaged in a multi-year debate about how to expand the
cryptocurrency’s capacity to keep up with demand.140 The debate remains
unresolved because no group has accrued the necessary consensus.141
Investors have noticed this paralysis. Bitcoin’s once dominant 87.6% market
share amongst cryptocurrencies, as of January 1, 2017, has declined to 37.1%
135. Id.
136. Jamie Redman, Small Ethereum Clones Getting Attacked by Mysterious ‘51 Crew’,
BITCOIN NEWS (Sept. 4, 2016), https://news.bitcoin.com/ethereum-clones-susceptible-51-
attacks/ [https://perma.cc/2KMR-LRYP].
137. Matthew Leising, The Ether Thief, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017), https://www.bloom
berg.com/features/2017-the-ether-thief/ [https://perma.cc/LA9U-SB5W].
138. Vitalik Buterin, Hard Fork Completed, ETHEREUM BLOG (July 20, 2016), https://blog
.ethereum.org/2016/07/20/hard-fork-completed/ [https://perma.cc/XU9G-6EVH].
139. Some people with a more libertarian or anti-establishment bent may argue this is a
strength.
140. Paul Vigna, Bitcoin Dodges Split That Threatened Its Surging Price, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-dodges-split-that-threatened-its-surgi
ng-price-1510172701 [https://perma.cc/7J7K-KR3L].
141. Id.
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one year later.142
Lost blockchain wallets are another weakness that needs a solution.
Blockchain wallets hold a person’s identification information. Without a
trusted third party, a blockchain user is responsible for keeping her
identification information safe. This information is typically stored on a
private key, in the form of a large succession of alphanumeric characters. If
a user’s private key is lost or corrupted, then she has no method of recovery.
Her transaction history and assets are orphaned forever on the blockchain. If
a third party finds or steals her key, then her assets could be taken without
recourse. Stories abound of fraud,143 hacks,144 and even physical muggings145
to access a user’s private key and empty her accounts. Making sure this
personal identification information is as secure as the information on the
blockchain is an ongoing challenge.
Privacy concerns also arise from blockchain. With a public or semi-
public blockchain, all transactions are visible. However, certain
shareholders or managers may wish to remain anonymous for strategic
reasons. Even in a pure permissioned blockchain with full anonymity, live
transaction history would give some nodes more complete and up to date
information than they could get anywhere else today. Services may also
develop that specialize in de-anonymizing nodes. Alternatively, too much
privacy facilitates anonymity enabling improper or criminal activities.
Balancing privacy and functionality is likely an issue that will never be
resolved. It requires balancing cultural norms and expectations with the
reality and potential power of blockchain’s heightened transparency.
Lastly, a blockchain requires immense storage capacity and energy
consumption. For example, only one bitcoin transaction in December 2017
required an estimated 250 kilowatt-hours of energy—enough to support an
average U.S. household for 8 days.146 Energy demands for bitcoin are so
142. COINMARKETCAP, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MARKET CAPITALIZATION (DOMINANCE),
https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/ [https://perma.cc/NZ37-A2DJ] (last visited Nov. 16,
2018).
143. Nathaniel Popper, As Bitcoin Bubble Loses Air, Frauds and Flaws Rise to the
Surface, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/technology/virtua
l-currency-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/AV56-784D].
144. Steven Russolillo, Hackers Steal More Than $70 Million in Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
7, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/millions-may-be-missing-in-bitcoin-heist-15126251
76 [https://perma.cc/ZBT2-BEFQ].
145. Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Thieves Threaten Real Violence for Virtual Currencies,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/technology/virtual-curren
cy-extortion.html [https://perma.cc/2WMD-BDXT].
146. Robert P. Murphy, Does Bitcoin Use Too Much Electricity?, INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY
RESEARCH (Jan. 18, 2018), https://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/bitcoin-use-much-
electricity/ [https://perma.cc/VJ2P-273K].
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large that many major bitcoin miners have resorted to extreme tactics to find
plentiful and affordable energy sources. More than two-thirds of bitcoin
mining comes from facilities in northern China’s Inner Mongolia that use
government-subsidized hydroelectric power and the region’s cool climate.147
Iceland’s large bitcoin mining operations run on the country’s renewable
geothermal energy and arctic air cooling.148 Storage capacity is also a worry
because as any blockchain grows, the required computing power of a node
increases. More nodes cannot meet these requirements and are unable to
continue participating, threatening a blockchain’s future growth potential.
(c) Variations
When discussing blockchain, it is important to recognize that the
technology encompasses many forms. Blockchain’s flexibility is a strength
that should allow it to effectively evolve. Many variations have developed
to offer differing degrees of control and decentralization across a spectrum
of options.
A public blockchain is one side of the spectrum. On a public
blockchain, anyone can join, read, edit, and verify information. Everyone
may participate in the consensus-building process. These blockchains are
entirely decentralized. Many advocates of public blockchains support them
because they decrease dependence on the trusted third-party sources prone
to error, corruption, and misbehavior.149
A permissioned (or private) blockchain is the other extreme.
Permissioned blockchains are run by a central authority that controls the
blockchain’s protocols.150 The central authority governs the community by
restricting access and changing rules as desired. Permissioned blockchains
are akin to traditional trusted source dependent databases, but ones built with
blockchain’s superior record-keeping architecture. This form offers some
147. Cao Li & Giulia Marchi, In China’s Hinterlands, Workers Mine Bitcoin for a Digital
Fortune, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/bi
tcoin-mine-china.html [https://perma.cc/5EZD-ZHY2].
148. Nathaniel Popper, Into the Bitcoin Mines, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK BLOG (Dec. 21,
2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/into-the-bitcoin-mines/ [https://perma.cc/9
4QM-5MZE].
149. Ian Allison, Nick Szabo: If Banks Want Benefits of Blockchains They Must Go
Permissionless, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nick-szabo-if-
banks-want-benefits-blockchains-they-must-go-permissionless-1518874
[https://perma.cc/MY9F-9L6S].
150. Giulio Prisco, Nick Szabo on ‘Permissioned Blockchains’ and the Block Size, BITCOIN
MAG. (Sept. 9, 2015), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/nick-szabo-permissioned-bl
ockchains-block-size-1441833598/ [https://perma.cc/96ZF-MXSQ].
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advantages. Transaction costs are cheaper because only a few nodes are
needed to verify a completed block. The central authority also potentially
provides sensible governance to address a blockchain’s faults. These
permissioned systems address concerns about collusion because the central
authority can prevent any miner or mining pool from attaining a controlling
stake. Culturally, they are likely more digestible among the public and
government authorities who are accustomed to some degree of centralized
management.
Between the two extremes are many hybrid forms combining features
of public and permissioned blockchains. In a so-called “sidechain,”
permissioned systems operate independently but then periodically connect
with a public blockchain.151 Inversely, Ethereum is a public blockchain that
allows everyone to create public and permissioned blockchain applications
upon it.152 The many hybrid forms of blockchain reveal that it is not a static,
uniform technology. Instead, it offers flexibility and customization based on
need.
B. Blockchain: A Foundational Technology
Blockchain is a foundational technology. A technology that creates
groundwork in society for other innovations to grow. As an example, in
1974, Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn published a paper describing a system of rules
allowing a digital network to share information.153 These rules are now
known as the Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP)154—the backbone of the
Internet. As a foundational technology, TCP/IP has supported countless
disruptive and value-adding innovations. The World Wide Web, e-
commerce, text and video messaging, social media, office tools, streaming,
sharing economies, search algorithms, and so on; these are only some of the
innumerable innovations inextricably tied to the foundational TCP/IP.
Although accurately forecasting the impact of foundational
technologies is impossible, Marco Iansiti and Karim R. Lakhani of Harvard
Business School offer a framework to understand their development.155 A
151. Adam Back et al., Enabling Blockchain Innovations with Pegged Sidechains
(unpublished working paper) (accessible at https://blockstream.com/sidechains.pdf)
[https://perma.cc/7TUQ-USL8].
152. A Next Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform, GITHUB
(Mar. 17, 2018), https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper [https://perma.cc/K
D5F-NMVA].
153. Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network
Intercommunications, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637 (1974).
154. Commonly referred to as “TCP/IP” after its two major protocols.
155. Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV.
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foundational technology evolves through four distinct phases—Single Use,
Localization, Substitution, and Transformational—that build upon one
another. Each phase is characterized by differing degrees of novelty and
complexity. The more novelty a technology possesses, the more original it
is to society. The more complexity a technology requires, the more networks
of people and systems must adopt and support it.
Blockchain’s development will require patience. Foundational
technologies develop gradually. A current generation’s long-standing
norms, behaviors, and institutions considered concrete are set in motion.
Society’s modern and powerful institutions become more old-fashioned and
weaker. Seemingly unrelated developments collide to yield unexpected
changes. The history of U.S. retail is telling. TCP/IP arose in 1974, but forty
years passed before most Americans felt comfortable shopping online rather
than in stores.156 In 1974, Sears dominated U.S. retail with annual sales
approaching 1% of the nation’s GDP and headquartered itself in the world’s
tallest building, aptly named the Sears Tower.157 By 2017, Sears—the so-
called “Amazon of the 20th-century”—teetered on bankruptcy amidst
seismic shifts in retail partly led by the Internet. In October 2018, Sears filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, a possible prelude to a future end of
operations and liquidation.158 Few people in 1974 could have imagined e-
commerce’s rise or Sears’ collapse spurred by the numerous new networks,
consumer behaviors, and innovations formed over decades. Foundational
technology revolutions are slow but steady.
This Comment presumes that blockchain-based applications in
shareholder voting will become more common, but will not completely
replace trust-based systems. This is based on several assumptions. As
detailed in Part I, the current shareholder voting system is irreparable using
existing non-blockchain technologies. Shareholders, especially institutional
investors, will increasingly be frustrated by the current system’s
shortcomings. In response, blockchain-based innovations will progressively
form new decentralized and transparent tools, networks, and institutions.
(2017).
156. See STATISTA, ONLINE SHOPPING PENETRATION IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
FROM 2010 TO 2013 WITH A FORECAST TO 2016 (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.statista.com/sta
tistics/373965/online-shopping-penetration-china-and-the-us/ (estimating that 50.4% of the
total U.S. population would shop online in 2014).
157. Suzanne Kapner, Inside the Decline of Sears, the Amazon of the 20th Century, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-decline-of-sears-the-amazon-
of-the-20th-century-1509472095 [https://perma.cc/PU7A-8L2Y].
158. Michael Corkery, Sears, the Original Everything Store, Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/business/sears-bankruptcy-filin
g-chapter-11.html [https://perma.cc/EZZ5-C89W].
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However, the law will continue to support centralized trusted sources as a
check on greater decentralization and loss of control. Total decentralization
of shareholder voting by blockchain will not occur in the foreseeable future.
Using the Iansiti and Lakhani framework, this Comment assesses how
blockchain-based technologies may develop through each phase to address
the problems of shareholder voting and share ownership.
(a) Single Use
The Single-Use phase is characterized by low levels of novelty and
complexity. Innovations address existing problems with solutions that are
more efficient, less costly, and more focused than the current alternatives.
At this phase, blockchain solutions will not revolutionize shareholder voting
so much as they will incrementally improve it.
Society has already entered the Single-Use phase. Blockchain-based
technologies that address empty voting and street name ownership have
already launched; in December 2016, Overstock.com became the first U.S.
public company to issue stock through a permissioned blockchain-based
platform based on the bitcoin blockchain.159 Per Overstock.com’s
prospectus, these blockchain-based securities are intended to eliminate street
name ownership and allow shareholders to trade directly in their name.160
All transaction information is public, but personal shareholder identification
information is private; only Overstock.com, the central authority, can see
personal information.161 In 2016, NASDAQ launched a pilot program on
Estonia’s Tallinn Stock Exchange that uses a blockchain-based e-voting
service to record and track shareholder votes.162 After a successful proof-of-
concept, NASDAQ launched a similar program in South Africa.163 In 2017,
Broadridge announced a successful test use of blockchain to complete proxy
votes in a private transaction.164
159. Cade Metz, Overstock Begins Trading Its Shares Via the Bitcoin Blockchain, WIRED
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/overstock-com-issues-stock-via-bitcoin-
blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/49TT-8FLF].
160. Overstock.com, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424(b)(3)) 34 (Dec. 9, 2015).
161. Id. at 36.
162. Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ’s Blockchain Technology to Transform the
Republic of Estonia’s e-Residency Shareholder Participation (Feb. 12, 2016), http://ir.nasdaq
.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=954654 [https://perma.cc/2FHE-JXPC].
163. Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ to Deliver Blockchain e-Voting Solution to
Strate, (Nov. 22, 2017), http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=1049610 [https://pe
rma.cc/X887-A7DB].
164. Pete Rizzo, Broadridge Completes Blockchain Proxy Voting Trial, COINDESK (Apr.
13, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/broadridge-blockchain-proxy-voting-jpmorgan-santan
der/ [https://perma.cc/VS9N-VCDP].
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If blockchain innovations prove cost-effective and efficient, they may
become the technological foundation of modern shareholder voting systems.
Within the next few years, corporations could increasingly rely on
permissioned blockchain-based technologies to manage share registration,
proxy voting, and vote counting. Management will recognize blockchain’s
cost-savings or shareholders will push for its transparency. In either case,
blockchain-based support systems for voting and ownership will
progressively become the rule, not the exception. Pure permissioned
blockchain systems will probably be preferred because central authorities
will not want to forfeit control. Share registration, proxy voting, and vote
counting will likely be the first areas addressed because these represent the
basic causes of problems afflicting shareholder voting and share ownership.
They are known issues.165 Cost-effective blockchain innovations offer the
needed accuracy, security, and transparency to solve them.
Blockchain’s impact on shareholder voting problems will be mixed.
Some forms of empty voting will become more difficult to execute. Share
ownership will be accurately tracked, limiting over-voting and multiple
ownership claims for one share that result from borrowing and lending.
Empty voting practices relying on discrepancies between record date and
meeting date will continue. However, blockchain systems will better expose
investors who hedge positions or re-arrange voting rights just prior to a
meeting. With more exposure, regulators, fellow shareholders, or
management could take countermeasures to fend off such tactics, re-shaping
investor behaviors.
Dependence on street name ownership will decline too. The street
name bureaucracy will diminish in size and power. Rather than using long
chains of nominees and custodians to hold shares, a shareholder will more
often own shares directly in her name. Corporations will have definitive and
accurate ownership records. Identifying beneficial ownership will not
require a Dante’s Inferno journey. Instead, identification will be quicker,
easier, and arguably more equitable for all shareholders.
Despite potential progress, some shareholder voting and ownership
trends will likely remain. Institutional investors, assuming their dominance
of equities continues, will still rely on voting shares rather than selling shares
to voice their displeasure with a corporation. Proxy advisories will maintain
their influence. Management will continue to exert power over the voting
process, although inappropriate activities will be more difficult to hide.
Corporations will remain board-centric. Throughout the Single-Use phase,
165. See supra Part I: The Present (outlining the well-known and frequently discussed
issues of modern share ownership).
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the relative weakness of shareholder voting will persist.
(b) Localization
The Localization phase comprises innovations with a high level of
novelty but a low level of complexity. Innovations are visionary and
revolutionary, while requiring only a small number of people or systems to
implement them. Localization may take many forms as blockchain-based
solutions expand beyond only addressing the underlying causes of current
shareholder voting and share ownership problems. During this phase,
corporations and shareholders will use blockchain-based technologies in
ways that enhance and change the existing shareholder voting systems.
Society has not yet reached this phase.
One possible innovation is the issuance of new stock classes.
Blockchain’s flexibility enables new strategic offerings. Boards could use
this flexibility to design stock classes that attract or deter certain investors.
For example, stock classes may offer differing degrees of privacy. Classes
with significant privacy would attract investors interested in anonymity.
Alternatively, classes with minimal privacy could act as a defensive measure
against activists and potential takeovers. Boards may issue stock classes
with built-in applications that provide automated services to shareholders. A
blockchain application could issue stock options for employees or fulfill
warrants for investors. Another application could facilitate tenured voting
by granting more votes to shareholders who have held their shares for a
specified period of time.
Boards possess the exclusive authority to regulate a corporation’s
capital structure and ensure the soundness of its instruments.166 This legal
fact is unlikely to change. However, the opportunity blockchain provides for
enhancing shareholder voting and stock ownership is too significant to
ignore. Powerful institutional investors will likely recognize this fact and
seek to push boards to issue stock classes that favor their interests. For
example, institutional investors may ask for tenured voting that rewards their
holding of shares for long periods of time. They may even seek stock classes
that award them additional votes if a particular corporate goal is not met.
Boards will also benefit by using stock classes to support and protect their
investment decisions.
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151-154, 157, 161 (2018).
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(c) Substitution
The Substitution phase is distinguished by a low level of novelty and a
high level of complexity. Solutions at this phase will compete with, and
partly replace, existing traditional business models and deeply embedded
institutions. New networks and behaviors will emerge.
The primary entities threatened by this phase of development are the
incumbents: the depository trusts, proxy service providers, proxy advisories,
and custodians that thrive and act as indispensable cogs in the current system.
Entities such as the DTC, Broadridge, ISS, and BNY Mellon are enormous,
wealthy, and entrenched titans. However, as blockchain technologies
become more ubiquitous, new competitors will emerge offering unique
services. As blockchain becomes easier to use, the cost of holding shares,
distributing materials, reviewing proposals, and clearing trades should shrink
dramatically. Corporations and shareholders will have new products to
choose from. They will also become more comfortable performing many
services on their own using blockchain innovations. Unless the incumbents
evolve and alter their business models, they will likely not exist within
several decades. Assuredly, they risk losing market share resulting from
more competition.
Many incumbents recognize the threat of blockchain to their business
models and have responded accordingly. They are heavily promoting
permissioned blockchains to streamline operations and offer lower cost
services.167 As an example, the DTC has already declared blockchain
technology is a “generational opportunity to reimagine the financial industry
infrastructure.”168 It hopes to lead the financial industry in a “collaborative
rearchitecture of core processes and practices to ensure standardization” as
blockchain is tested and adopted.169 Unsurprisingly, DTC opposes
decentralized systems using public blockchains. DTC recognizes that a
decentralized and trustless infrastructure is “the virtual opposite of the
centralized, trusted, guarded, model of modern securities processing, which
has long relied upon [DTC] . . . as a central authority”170—in short,
decentralized and public blockchain systems are bad for its business. Still,
DTC is probably correct to assume that central authorities will persist. The
167. MORGAN STANLEY, BANKING ON THE BLOCKCHAIN (May 18, 2016),
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/big-banks-try-to-harness-blockchain [https://perma.c
c/334U-J655].
168. DTCC, EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS
TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE 11 (2016).
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 1.
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laws, rules, and regulations framing shareholder voting will demand a
controlling entity responsible for decision-making and accountable for
errors. Shareholders will also want such assurances before investing.
The threat to incumbents, then, will be the entrance of new, unexpected,
and disruptive blockchain-based competitors. These incumbents are
susceptible to the innovator’s dilemma.171 Under the innovator’s dilemma
theory, a powerful incumbent such as DTC or Broadridge is a prisoner to
expectations. Its shareholders expect large earnings, its broad customer base
expects sustained service, and its management expects proven monetization
models to remain profitable. These expectations encourage a firm to
maintain the status quo and avoid innovations that do not mesh with core
customers. New entrants, in comparison, are beholden to no one. They enter
a market and introduce new products possessing attributes the incumbent
ignores. Consumer preferences shift and the new products mature. The
incumbent is flat-footed. Still beholden to its time-tested ways, an
incumbent’s response to new entrants is often too late. The new entrant’s
market share grows and eventually surpasses the incumbent.
The incumbents of shareholder voting will feel a similar pressure.
Many will lose market share as new competition arises. Sears and Amazon
are apt examples of this dynamic. Although e-commerce has flourished at
the expense of formerly giant legacy retailers such as Sears, in-store
shopping still exists. In fact, Amazon has recently entered brick-and-mortar
retailing by opening its own stores172 and acquiring conventional retailers
such as Whole Foods.173 A similar trend will likely occur for firms involved
in shareholder voting. The Substitution phase will not mean the end for
every incumbent. Instead, it will signal the end of their hegemony over
shareholder voting.
(d) Transformation
Transformation is the final phase. Innovations are characterized by
171. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (2016) (introducing the theory of “disruptive
innovation,” which explains how successful incumbent companies are susceptible to losing
market share or even failing as new entrants provide innovations that the incumbent fails to
adequately anticipate or address).
172. Laura Stevens, Amazon’s Cashierless ‘Go’ Convenience Store Set to Open, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-cashierless-go-convenience-
store-set-to-open-1516546801 [https://perma.cc/F57S-3WCX].
173. Laura Stevens & Annie Gasparro, Amazon to Buy Whole Foods for $13.7 Billion,
WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-to-buy-whole-foods-for-
13-7-billion-1497618446 [https://perma.cc/4Y7K-TUQ9].
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high levels of novelty and complexity. The potential is almost limitless.
Entirely new industries built around entirely new products and new
consumer behaviors will arise.
Up until the transformation phase, it seems likely that permissioned
blockchains will be the norm amongst most blockchain technologies. The
laws and regulations of corporate governance require a certain degree of
formalistic security, privacy, and top-down decision-making that public
blockchains cannot provide for shareholder voting. Assuming the
fundamental structure of corporate governance law remains unchanged,
corporate decision-making will remain board-centric and shareholders will
be relatively less powerful. Predictions beyond that dynamic are purely
speculative.
One fascinating idea in the very long-term is the emergence of
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) for shareholder voting.
DAOs are autonomous groups that run and make decisions based on pre-
programmed blockchain protocols. They operate self-sufficiently through
collective action independent of third-parties.174 Although boards will
remain the primary business decision makers, some DAOs could become
important influencers of board membership and shareholder proposals.
Proxy access has already increased the ability of shareholders to nominate
directors in large publicly traded companies. If this trend holds, shareholder
DAOs could form to promote particular social or business causes by
nominating directors who support their views. For example, diffuse retail
shareholders who advocate for workplace diversity could join a DAO that
advocates for this cause. The DAO, using its blockchains protocols and
algorithmic decision making, would then pool the votes of these separate
shareholders to nominate and elect directors who focus on this initiative.
These groups would be like self-sufficient proxy advisories. They perform
the difficult work of assessing proposals, coordinating shareholders, and
optimizing their votes to spark positive change for shareholder interests.
Gradually, DAOs could shift the composition of boards and the importance
of shareholder proposals.
The most transformational long-term effect of blockchain may be how
it changes shareholder behavior. Retail investors currently vote at very low
rates.175 They suffer from collective action problems; retail investors
cumulatively represent significant blocks of shares, but an individual retail
174. See generally AARON WRIGHT & PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI, DECENTRALIZED
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF LEX CRYPTOGRAPHIA (Mar. 12, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Yeshiva University and Université Paris II) (discussing
the drawbacks and benefits as blockchain leads to potentially more decentralization).
175. BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, INC & PWC, supra note 83.
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investor has few incentives to incur the time and effort costs of voting.
Blockchain tools such as DAOs would lower these costs and potentially
motivate more shareholders to vote. Blockchain has the potential to
revolutionize the norms of shareholder engagement in corporate governance.
CONCLUSION
Modern shareholder voting is troubled.
In theory, a corporation gives its board of directors tremendous power
to make business decisions, while shareholder voting checks the board.
Reality is different. Fueled by the complexities of street name ownership,
corporations do not know who their voters are and empty voting routinely
results. Hedging and lending practices permit some shareholders to over-
vote or avoid having an economic interest in the outcome. Vote counting is
often inaccurate. Perhaps unsurprisingly, management disproportionately
wins close contests, suggesting that votes are manipulated.
Blockchain presents a possible solution. With a simple yet ingenious
design, blockchain provides the accuracy, transparency, and trust currently
missing from shareholder voting. Weaknesses with the technology remain.
Collusion, sensible governance, privacy, and technical shortcomings may
hinder its potential. However, as blockchain evolves solutions should
emerge. Variations already provide differing degrees of control and
decentralization, facilitating flexibility and customization. Assuming
blockchain’s weaknesses are mitigated, the technology is poised to
eventually revolutionize shareholder voting.
The Iansiti and Lakhani framework for foundational technologies helps
theorize about how blockchain solutions will progressively apply to
shareholder voting. Blockchain will proceed through four phases. In each,
innovations will display varying degrees of novelty and complexity.
At first, in the Single Use phase, applications will have low novelty and
complexity. They will provide more efficient, less costly, and more focused
solutions than the other alternatives for shareholder voting. As an example,
corporations may use blockchains to manage share registration, proxy
voting, and vote counting. Street name ownership will decrease and empty
voting will become much more difficult to accomplish. More manipulations
by management will be exposed. Many of these innovations have already
launched. During the Localization phase, applications will become more
novel by enhancing the current shareholder voting procedures. One potential
innovation may be new types of stock classes. Classes that provide unique
services and incentives to attract (or deter) specific types of investors. Some
may offer different degrees of privacy, automatic execution of options and
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warrants, tenured voting, or the connection of voting rights to company
performance. In the Substitution phase, new networks based on blockchain
will emerge. Entire business models and institutions will perish unless they
adapt. The depository trusts, proxy service providers, and custodians
essential to share ownership will face extinction. Lastly, at the
Transformation phase almost anything is possible. Novel innovations and
complex new networks will form. Unpredictable developments will force
everyone to re-evaluate core principles. The board-centric nature of
governance will probably remain. But blockchain-based technologies will
give shareholders new tools to coordinate and tear down obstacles thwarting
their engagement, influence, and ability to hold boards accountable. Activist
DAOs are only one intriguing outcome. For shareholder advocates, the
future is as bright as their imagination.
